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GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED RELIGIOUS
DISPLAYS: TRANSPARENT
RATIONALIZATIONS AND EXPEDIENT
POST-MODERNISM
Douglas Laycock†
The founding generation said that government is not a competent
judge of religious truth,1 and for half a century now, the Supreme
Court has applied that principle to government speech. Government is
not supposed to take positions, pro or con, on truth claims about
religion. Government must resist its recurring temptation to proclaim
that Christianity is true.
This rule has always encountered vigorous resistance in some parts
of the country and vigorous dissent on the Court. There may be five
votes to overrule the whole line of cases restricting passive religious
displays. But Justices do not always resort to overruling; they have
other ways of dealing with their least favorite cases.2 They may
restrict or eliminate standing.3 Or they may simply manipulate the
findings of fact so that they never find the rule to have been violated.

† Armistead M. Dobie Professor of Law, Horace W. Goldsmith Research Professor of
Law, and Professor of Religious Studies, University of Virginia; and Alice McKean Young
Regents Chair in Law Emeritus, University of Texas at Austin. I am grateful to Shea Gibbons
for research assistance.
1 See, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
¶ 5 (1785), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63–72 (1947) (Appendix to
opinion of Rutledge, J., dissenting) (arguing that to treat the “Civil Magistrate [as] a competent
Judge of Religious truth . . . is an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of
Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world”).
2 See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (2010) (“[W]hat disturbs critics [of stealth overruling] is
the disingenuous treatment of precedents in a manner that obscures fundamental change in the
law.”).
3 See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) (holding
that standing to challenge expenditures of government funds for religious purposes does not
extend to tax credits); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007)
(holding that standing to challenge expenditures of government funds for religious purposes
does not extend to discretionary expenditures by executive branch).
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This paper examines recent developments in the strategy of
manipulating or recharacterizing the facts. In a sense, this paper is an
exercise in belaboring the obvious. When Justices and government
lawyers defend government-sponsored religious displays by claiming
that the display is really secular, the argument is often rather
conclusory. But the response is often even more conclusory. “Just
look at it. See! It’s religious.” I will spell out in more detail why these
messages can only be understood as religious, and then address the
Court’s latest theory for avoiding that obvious conclusion.
I.

NATIVITY SCENES

Once the rule emerged that government is not to take positions on
religious questions, government lawyers began to argue that religious
statements and symbols also have secular meanings, and that, of
course, the sponsoring government unit intended only the secular
meaning. There is much sham litigation of this sort, and sometimes
the Court goes along.
Consider the Christian nativity scene, or crèche. It is so familiar,
and so much a part of a holiday that has been used and abused for
many other purposes, that many Americans probably never think
about what it actually depicts. But Christians of moderate or greater
seriousness do think about it, and non-Christians who care about
government neutrality also think about it. The nativity scene is at the
very least a depiction of a man, a woman, shepherds, and richly
dressed men with crowns kneeling in worshipful postures and
attitudes around a baby.
Of course we all know who these figures are supposed to be. The
baby, often depicted with a halo, is the central figure in the Christian
story. But suppose we pretend that we do not know who these figures
are supposed to be. Is there any other way to interpret this display?
The figures are worshiping the baby because, according to
Christian belief, the baby is the Son of God—actually himself also
God—incarnated in human form. Is any other interpretation possible?
Well, those who worship the baby could be engaged in idolatry. Or
they could be worshiping a false god. Non-Christians, who do not
believe that the baby is God or that he represents God, may think that
the figures must necessarily be doing one or both of these. But no
government that puts up a nativity scene is endorsing the worship of
idols or false gods. That would be political suicide. It is socially
acceptable to depict the adults in the nativity scene as worshiping the
baby because—and only because—the baby is understood to be God.
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The nativity scene thus necessarily depicts the first of the two
miracles at the heart of Christianity. The nativity scene depicts the
incarnation of God in human form—or as much Christian literature
refers to it, the Incarnation with a capital I.4 Not everyone who
casually views or passes by a nativity scene thinks of this miracle, but
without the Incarnation, the nativity scene becomes either a
meaningless arrangement of figures engaged in some unidentifiable
activity (which no one believes), or it becomes a depiction of false
worship—a depiction that would horrify its sponsors. If you think
about it even a little bit seriously, the nativity scene can only
represent the Christian belief in the Incarnation.
Of course this is not what the Supreme Court or the government
said when the first nativity scene reached the Court, in Lynch v.
Donnelly.5 The opinion did seem to concede “the religious nature of
the crèche.”6 But then it made two moves that recur in these cases.
First, the Court said the District Court “erred by focusing almost
exclusively on the crèche.”7 It was a mistake to focus on the intensely
religious display that was the matter in controversy; courts should
instead consider only some larger unit that includes the intensely
religious display, and consider the larger unit as a whole.8 I call this
the larger-unit argument. When the crèche is viewed in its larger
context, the Court said, there is “insufficient evidence to establish that
the inclusion of the crèche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to
express some kind of subtle government advocacy of a particular
religious message.”9 We can all agree that it was not surreptitious or
subtle. It was open and obvious.
And it was certainly purposeful; the city did not put up the crèche
by accident. But the Court said it was not a purposeful “effort to
express some kind of . . . particular religious message.”10 This is the
second frequent move: they put it up, but they didn’t mean it. I call
this the didn’t-mean-it argument. Even if they portrayed the miracle
of the Incarnation (although the Court never alludes to anything so
explicit), they didn’t mean that anyone should take it literally as the
4 See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE C ATHOLIC CHURCH 130 § 464 (Doubleday ed., 1997 ed.)
(“The unique and altogether singular event of the Incarnation does not mean that Jesus Christ
is . . . a confused mixture of the divine and the human. He became truly man while remaining
truly God.”).
5 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
6 Id. at 680.
7 Id.
8 See id. (arguing that the crèche should be “viewed in the proper context of the
Christmas Holiday season”).
9 Id.
10 Id.
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miracle of the Incarnation. Rather, “[t]he crèche in the display depicts
the historical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a
National Holiday.”11
This last sentence is utterly inscrutable. Is the “event” the same as
the “origins”—the adults worshiping the baby? Or is the “event” the
modern celebration of Christmas, with the adults worshiping the baby
as the “origins” of that event? And however that may be, in what
sense are these “origins” historical? What is depicted is either
miraculous or mythical—either it really was the miracle Christians
believe it to have been, or it never happened, which is what the great
majority of the world’s population believes. If it never happened, then
it is not historical. When the Court describes the event as historical, it
asserts the truth of at least this part of the Christian story.
Assuming the event did happen, it seems rather odd to describe a
miraculous event as merely historical. But of course Christians who
fully believe in the miracle believe that it actually happened and that
it happened in historic time. So from a Christian perspective, the
event is historical as well as miraculous. The reason it seems odd for
the Court to describe the event as historical is that it is historical only
if you believe in the miracle. It is very troubling for the Court to
announce that a miraculous claim of one religion is true, especially
when that religion makes exclusive claims to truth, with the
unavoidable implication that all other religions are false. Yet that is
what the Court did in Lynch. In the course of trying to minimize the
religious significance of the crèche, the Court affirmed its belief in
the miracle.
II.

THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

I have elaborated the religious significance of the Pledge of
Allegiance elsewhere,12 so a summary will suffice here. The Pledge
includes a succinct affirmation of faith. In public schools, we ask each
child to personally acknowledge the existence of a monotheistic God
who is somehow over an entire nation: “I pledge allegiance to . . . one
nation under God . . . .”13
Yet the government briefs defending the Pledge denied that it had
any religious meaning. The United States argued that the Pledge “is

Id.
See Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious
Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 223–29
(2004).
13 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) (emphasis added).
11
12
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not a religious exercise at all . . . .”14 Rather, the meaning is merely
historical and demographic:
[T]he reference to God acknowledges the undeniable
historical facts that the Nation was founded by individuals
who believed in God, that the Constitution’s protection of
individual rights and autonomy reflects those religious
convictions, and that the Nation continues as a matter of
demographic and cultural fact to be “a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”15
Here, the government applies the didn’t-mean-it argument to text and
not just to nonverbal symbols. Chief Justice Rehnquist accepted these
claims,16 but they do not bear examination. That most of the Founders
believed in God, and that most Americans today believe in God, are
historic and demographic facts. The rest of the government’s
allegedly “undeniable . . . facts”17 are denied by nonbelievers, who of
course do not believe that either individual rights or a republican form
of government reflects, presupposes, or depends on the existence of
God. No doubt many believers also doubt or deny these claims about
our political institutions.
But more important here, none of these alleged facts is asserted or
implied in the Pledge. It is not difficult to communicate the difference
between what I personally believe and what I recognize that others
believe, and the Pledge is a statement of the former. It is a personal
pledge, an affirmation of what “I” pledge myself to. There is no
reference to the Founders or to the majority of Americans or to any
other third party, but only to the first person singular—only to what
each person saying the Pledge believes.
Secular reinterpretations of religious symbols and affirmations, as
in the government’s novel interpretation of the Pledge, have a cost to
the religious supporters of government exercises of religion. The
government officials and their lawyers who make such arguments,
and the judges who accept them, desacralize sacred texts and
symbols. But these actors seem to assume that few Americans will
14 Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioners 45, Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-1624), 2003 WL 23051994 [hereinafter
Newdow Brief for United States].
15 Id. at 32–33 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
16 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 31 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“The phrase ‘under God’ is in no sense a prayer, nor an
endorsement of any religion, but a simple recognition of the fact noted in H. R. Rep. No. 1693,
at 2: ‘From the time of our earliest history our peoples and our institutions have reflected the
traditional concept that our Nation was founded on a fundamental belief in God.’”).
17 Newdow Brief for United States, supra note 14, at 32.
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take note of their arguments and that no one will take them seriously.
The religious references will retain their obvious religious meanings
outside the courtroom even if government lawyers and the Court
solemnly deny those meanings inside the courtroom.
This assumption is always at least implicit; in the Pledge case, it
became explicit. At the same time that the President’s Solicitor
General was denying the religious meaning of the Pledge, the
President himself was affirming it. His letter responding to citizens
who wrote about the Pledge embraced and even inflated the religious
meaning:
As citizens recite the Pledge of Allegiance, we help define
our Nation. In one sentence, we affirm our form of
government, our belief in human dignity, our unity as a
people, and our reliance on God. . . .
When we pledge allegiance to One Nation under God, our
citizens participate in an important American tradition of
humbly seeking the wisdom and blessing of Divine
Providence.18
In the President’s view, the Pledge of Allegiance is not just an
affirmation of faith; it is also a prayer. I would not go so far; the
implication of prayer is not compelled by the syntax, logic, or context
of the Pledge. But the President’s account comes much closer to the
truth than the Solicitor General’s account. The President’s account
went to voters, conveying the Administration’s actual position. The
Solicitor General’s account was meant only for the Justices.
The Solicitor General also offered the larger-unit argument: the
Pledge as a whole is patriotic, not religious, and therefore, the
religious content should be ignored.19 Chief Justice Rehnquist accepted
this argument too.20 This reasoning is even worse here than it was in the
nativity scene cases. The conjunction of religious and patriotic
propositions makes the request for a religious affirmation worse, not
better.
18 Letter from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to Mitsuo Murashige,
President, Hawaii State Federation of Honpa Hongawanji Lay Associations (Nov. 13, 2002)
reprinted in Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State et al. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Affirmance 30, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004) (No. 02-1624), 2004 WL 298118. See Laycock, supra note 12, at 225 n.454 for the
explanation of how we can infer that this was a widely distributed form letter.
19 See Newdow Brief for United States, supra note 14, at 39–40. (“In divorcing the phrase
‘under God’ from its larger context, the court of appeals ‘plainly erred.’”).
20 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 31 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“Reciting
the Pledge, or listening to others recite it, is a patriotic exercise, not a religious one . . . .”).
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In the Christmas and Hanukah cases, the Court viewed the display
of secular and religious symbols as creating a sort of forum, in which
government could be taken to send multiple messages. The religious
and secular messages were not so much combined as presented in the
alternative. The reindeer and talking wishing well in Lynch did not
secularize the nativity scene; rather, they communicated another view
of Christmas. The Christmas tree in County of Allegheny v. ACLU21
neither secularized nor Christianized the menorah; together, the tree
and the menorah communicated symbols of two holidays, two faiths,
and a message of religious pluralism. The Court held that, taken as a
whole, these mixed messages did not endorse the religious meaning
of either Christmas or Hanukkah. Or at least, this is the most generous
interpretation of why the Court upheld the crèche in Lynch, where it
was accompanied by Santa Claus, reindeer, candy canes, and a talking
wishing well,22 and struck down the crèche in Allegheny, where the
crèche stood alone.23
I set aside here the question whether the government should
communicate any view, religious or secular, about a profoundly
religious holiday, or whether any symbol of such a holiday can be
viewed as secular. Even accepting the Court’s analysis of Christmas
at full value, the Pledge is very different. In the Pledge, the religious
and secular messages are inextricably combined, with the religious
message squarely in the middle of a single sentence with the patriotic
message. Asking students to affirm both messages neither neutralizes
the religious affirmation nor offers an alternative. Instead, it casts
doubt on the patriotism and political allegiance of those who cannot
in good faith affirm the religious portion of the message. What kind
of citizen cannot recite in good faith the full pledge of allegiance to
the nation?
Moreover, this merger of political and religious affirmations
evades a well-settled distinction as to remedy. When government
requires or asks for a political or patriotic recital, the remedy for
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671 (describing the display).
23 See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598 (“Here, unlike in Lynch, nothing in the context
of the display detracts from the crèche’s religious message.”). As to the menorah, see id. at 616
(opinion of Blackmun, J.) (“[T]he combined display of the tree, the sign, and the
menorah . . . simply recognizes that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winterholiday season, which has attained a secular status in our society.”); id. at 635 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the city “intended to convey
a message of pluralism and freedom of belief during the holiday season”). The passages from
Justice Blackmun, and from the opinion of the Court (also by Justice Blackmun), make
desacralization explicit: religious displays are constitutionally permitted if government “detracts
from” the religious message, and Christmas and Chanukah are part of the secular “winterholiday season.”
21
22
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dissenters is exemption.24 But when government asks for prayers or a
religious recital, exemption is not a sufficient remedy; government is
forbidden to ask.25 The reason for this distinction is that government
can attempt to lead public opinion on political and patriotic matters,
but not on religious matters.26 That distinction is eviscerated if
government can insert prayers or religious affirmations into political
and patriotic affirmations and characterize the resulting whole as
political or patriotic.
III. THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
A.

The Supreme Court

The opinions upholding the Texas Ten Commandments monument
in Van Orden v. Perry27 were not as bad as most on the question
considered here. Both Chief Justice Rehnquist for the plurality, and
Justice Breyer for the fifth vote, acknowledged that the
Commandments were religious. “Of course, the Ten Commandments
are religious—they were so viewed at their inception and so
remain.”28 “On the one hand, the Commandments’ text undeniably
has a religious message, invoking, indeed emphasizing, the Deity.”29
The Justices in the majority were not explicit about that religious
content; one cannot learn what the monument actually said from
either of these opinions, or from either opinion below.30 For that, you
have to go to the dissent.31
The content of the display was profoundly religious. The displayed
text stated:

24 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630, 642 (1943) (affirming a
judgment with respect to the (then entirely secular) Pledge of Allegiance, “restrain[ing]
enforcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class”).
25 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (invalidating school-sponsored prayer
and holding it irrelevant that students had the option not to join in the prayer).
26 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591–92 (1992) (explaining that government can
participate in political debates but generally cannot participate in religious debates).
27 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
28 Id. at 690 (plurality opinion).
29 Id. at 700–01 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
30 See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); Van
Orden v. Perry, No. A-01-CA-833-H, 2002 WL 32737462 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2002), aff’d, 351
F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
31 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 707 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reprinting the full text of the
monument).
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the Ten Commandments
I AM the LORD thy God.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images.
Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain.
Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honor thy father and thy mother that thy days may be long
upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
That shalt not covet thy neighbor's house.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant,
nor his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy
neighbors [sic].32
The first two lines are centered and in larger type, approximately
as shown here. The second line with its first person pronoun (and also
the first person pronoun in the first sentence of what is here presented
as the First Commandment) make clear that this is supposed to be
God speaking. The monument explicitly presents the Commandments
as Christians and Jews have always understood them—as the direct
Word of God.
The first two Commandments in this numbering system33 are
exclusively about the believer’s relationship with God. This is equally
true of the Third Commandment in this numbering system: there may
be a secular norm of weekly rest and relaxation, or of giving workers
a day off, but there can be no secular equivalent to an obligation to
keep a day “holy.” “Holy” is an inherently religious concept. And
32 Id. at 707; see also id. at 736 (Appendix to opinion of Stevens, J., dissenting) (fold-out
color photograph of the monument). The text in this photograph is more easily read in the
United States Reports or on the Supreme Court’s website (http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/04pdf/03-1500.pdf) than in Lexis or Westlaw.
33 There are multiple versions of the Commandments—different texts, different
translations, and different numbering systems—and these differences have theological
significance. See generally Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn
and Elsewhere, 73 FORD. L. REV. 1477, 1481–1500 (2005). In most Protestant traditions, but
not in Lutheranism, the Commandment against graven images is listed separately as the Second
Commandment. Id. at 1487. I have listed and numbered the Commandments as they appear on
the monument at issue in Van Orden, which is substantially identical to many other monuments
donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 713 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the monument “was only one of over a hundred largely identical
monoliths”). The idea for the Eagles’ Ten Commandments monuments originated in Minnesota,
id., where Lutheranism is probably the largest denomination. But I have not been able to
determine whether the Eagles’ text was negotiated in Minnesota.
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while there should be a secular norm of honoring one’s parents, there
can be no secular equivalent to the promise of longevity attached to
the performance of that Commandment, or to the Jewish belief that
God promised the land of Israel to the Jews.
Some of the remaining Commandments have clear secular
equivalents. But even “Thou shalt not kill” is not a mere statement of
secular ethics or modern criminal law; it is presented here as a direct
command from God. And the religious meaning of these
Commandments may correspond only approximately to the legal
meaning of modern prohibitions.
At least the Supreme Court acknowledged that this text was
religious. Chief Justice Rehnquist for the plurality contented himself
with listing other public depictions of the Ten Commandments and
other religious statements by American political figures and then
concluding that the Commandments had not just a religious meaning,
but also “an undeniable historical meaning, as the foregoing examples
demonstrate.”34 To say that the Commandments are “historical” is to
repeat the fallacy of Lynch v. Donnelly. A miracle—God’s
appearance on a mountaintop to carve laws in stone—is “historical”
only if it really happened. Whether it really happened is a matter of
faith.
Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist meant only that the depictions of
the Commandments in public places were historical—that the
Commandments had historically been used to symbolize laws and law
giving. There is force to that, but to stop there is to ignore enormous
differences of degree. As the dissenters explained in some detail,
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s examples depict Moses and the Ten
Commandments as part of a diverse array of other figures from
various religious and secular traditions.35 Putting Moses and the Ten
Commandments in a display of lawgivers with Hammurabi,
Confucius, Draco, Lycurgus, and Mohammed36 no more endorses the
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 740–41 & n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing why the “monument's
presentation of the Commandments with religious text emphasized and enhanced stands in
contrast to any number of perfectly constitutional depictions of them”); see also id. at 712
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Surely, the mere compilation of religious symbols, none of which
includes the full text of the Commandments and all of which are exhibited in different settings,
has only marginal relevance to the question presented in this case.”).
36 This describes the frieze of the Supreme Court. See Office of the Curator, Supreme
Court of the United States, Courtroom Friezes: North and South Walls, www.supremecourt.
gov/about/north&southwalls.pdf (last updated May 8, 2003) (describing the various figures
depicted in the friezes); Office of the Curator, Supreme Court of the United States, The East
Pediment, www.supremecourt.gov/about/eastpediment.pdf (last updated May 22, 2003)
(quoting the East Pediment’s sculptor Hermon A. MacNeil’s statement that “Moses, Confucius
and Solon are chosen as representing three great civilizations and form the central group of this
Pediment”).
34
35
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Commandments than it endorses Draco and his draconian penalties
for the smallest offenses. A rule excluding the Ten Commandments
from such an array would be a rule discriminating against Judaism
and Christianity instead of a rule preventing the government from
promoting Judaism or Christianity.
Moreover, most of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s examples are only
symbolic representations—two tablets, or a man in robes with tablets,
with no legible English writing. The bit of Hebrew visible on the
frieze in the Supreme Court’s chamber is from the Commandments
against killing and stealing, without mention of God or duties to
God.37 Such symbolic allusions to a religious teaching may be
unconstitutional if not part of any larger secular message, or they may
be viewed as de minimis, but either way, the constitutional problem
they present is quite modest compared to the freestanding display of
sacred text at issue in Van Orden.
Justice Breyer, for the fifth vote, agreed that much of the text was
religious, but he argued that the text was not dispositive. The case
depended on “how the text is used,” and that required consideration
of “the context of the display.”38 He thought the display
“communicates not simply a religious message, but a secular message
as well.”39 He apparently thought that the secular message addressed
“proper standards of social conduct.”40 This is an unstated application
of the larger-unit theory: at least the first three Commandments are
about one’s relationship to God, and are not, under any interpretation,
about proper standards of social conduct. But those Commandments,
and the claimed source of these Commandments, can apparently be
disregarded if they are part of a larger unit that does include “proper
standards of social conduct.”
Justice Breyer went on to persuade himself not just that this
display has a secular component, but that its purpose and effect are
“primarily nonreligious.”41 The monument was donated by a secular
organization (the Fraternal Order of Eagles) interested in combating
juvenile delinquency.42 This may suggest an emphasis on the rules of
social conduct, but it also suggests an emphasis on the divine origin
of those rules. Why should juvenile delinquents take these
Commandments any more seriously than they took what their parents
told them, or their probation officers, or the judges in juvenile court?
37
38
39
40
41
42

See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 740 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 703 (emphasis added).
Id. at 701.
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The only answer is that these Commandments claim to come directly
from God. Not only is it hard to think of any other reason, but this is
the reason the Eagles emphasized when they explained to local
chapters how to persuade local clergy and local officials to support
the program of erecting Ten Commandments monuments. They said
there could be no better youth guidance program “than the laws
handed down by God Himself,” and that “[t]he erection of these
monoliths is to inspire all who pause to view them, with a renewed
respect for the law of God . . . .”43
The hoped-for consequence of a reduction in juvenile delinquency
could come about only if juvenile delinquents believe the message of
the Commandments and act on it. Fighting juvenile delinquency is of
course a secular purpose, but the proposed means—encouraging
juveniles to believe a religious teaching—is a religious purpose that
requires an endorsement of that religious teaching as an essential step.
If government could encourage religion whenever it hoped that more
widespread religious faith would lead to secular benefits, it could
justify any degree of establishment of religion it chose to pursue.
The argument that encouraging belief in the Commandments
might reduce juvenile delinquency is just a special case of the last
major argument for established churches in the founding era: that
promoting religious faith would tend to produce a more moral and
law-abiding citizenry.44 The Founders rejected that argument not on
the ground that it was false, but on the ground that it was insufficient
to justify establishment. Opponents of establishment did not deny that
religion is conducive to morality, but they believed that government
support for religion was both unnecessary and counterproductive to
genuine religious faith.45 We know, with far more than the usual
degree of clarity in historical arguments, that the founders rejected the
promotion of good behavior as a justification for establishment. We
know they rejected the arguments for establishment because they
abolished all the formal state establishments and passed the federal
Establishment Clause to prevent a federal establishment.
The argument about juvenile delinquency probably does not
deserve to be taken even this seriously. What became the Eagles’ Ten
Commandments monuments originated with a Minnesota juvenile
court judge who wanted to post paper copies of the Ten
43 Id. at 714–15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 348
F. Supp. 1170, 1171–72 (D. Utah 1972), rev’d on other grounds, 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973)).
44 See, e.g., Barnes v. Inhabitants of First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 401, 406–
08 (1810) (justifying the Massachusetts establishment on the ground that it would make for a
more moral and socially compliant citizenry).
45 See, e.g., Madison, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 6–8.
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Commandments in courtrooms where delinquents might see them and
perhaps come to obey them.46 It is a long evolution, decisively
influenced by Cecil B. DeMille,47 from that original idea of paper
copies in courtrooms to granite monuments in city parks and on the
grounds of state capitols. The capitol grounds are not where anyone
would sensibly put a message intended to reach juvenile delinquents,
who are hardly known for their interest in touring civic sites. The
original focus on juvenile delinquents is an interesting bit of history,
but it had become essentially irrelevant to the actual monument at
issue.
Justice Breyer also found secular significance in the monument’s
setting, which he thought was not conducive to prayer or meditation.48
But he thought the setting and the other monuments on the capitol
grounds conveyed a moral and historic message to visitors and the
State’s intention that the moral message in the Ten Commandments
predominate over the religious message.49 I consider the other
monuments below, in connection with the court of appeals’ opinion,
but it takes considerable imagination to find much commonality
between the Ten Commandments and all the other monuments on the
grounds of the Texas capitol.
Finally, Justice Breyer thought it significant that the monument
had stood for forty years (from 1961 to 2001) before anyone filed a
lawsuit.50 A grandfather clause, or a rule of laches that applies to all
potential plaintiffs as a class and does not start anew with each
generation, is a potential way to solve the political problem presented
by these cases without saying foolish things about the secular purpose
and effect of displaying religious texts and symbols. But Justice
Breyer did not content himself with a mere time bar; he tried to give a
reason. And the reason was extraordinarily naïve.
He said, “I am not aware of any evidence suggesting that [the lack
of earlier lawsuits] was due to a climate of intimidation.”51
Consequently, the lack of earlier lawsuits must mean that nearly
everyone interpreted the monument in secular rather than religious

46 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 713–14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reviewing the origin of
this and similar monuments around the country).
47 DeMille thought that installing Ten Commandments monuments around the country
would help promote his blockbuster movie, The Ten Commandments. He “teamed up” with the
Eagles during the filming. See id. at 713.
48 See id. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The physical setting of the
monument, moreover, suggests little or nothing of the sacred.”).
49 Id.
50 See id. at 702–03.
51 Id. at 702.
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terms.52 If the presence or absence of intimidation mattered, he should
have suggested a remand for trial of that issue, because no one had
had any reason to introduce such evidence at the original trial. But if
we are going to try to infer the reason why no one sued for forty
years, the assumption that everyone saw the monument as secular
would be far down the list of possible reasons.
It is far more plausible to infer, especially in a southern city, that
everyone saw the message as religious and that nearly everyone
approved, and that many members of the minority who might have
complained never visited the capitol and didn’t even know the
monument existed.
It is far more plausible to infer that those who knew and might
have complained saw little hope of success in filing a lawsuit until at
least 1980, when Stone v. Graham53 struck down displays of the Ten
Commandments in Kentucky classrooms.54 And sensible lawyers
might have quite plausibly viewed Stone as a school case, which is
how the Court distinguished it in Van Orden.55 After Stone, the Court
did not strike down another government-sponsored religious display
until County of Allegheny v. ACLU56 in 1989.
And finally, it is far more plausible to infer that anyone who knew
about the display, objected to it, and thought he could win a lawsuit
might have been intimidated, or at least might have thought it was just
not worth the cost in hassle and social disapproval to pursue a lawsuit
that would produce intense political resistance and no monetary
recovery. Justice Breyer was on the Court when it decided Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe,57 the football-prayer case, where
the district judge allowed plaintiffs to litigate anonymously and had to
make sweeping threats of contempt sanctions to protect them from
intimidation and harassment.58 Breyer knew that history, or at least he
once had known it. He had no way to know that some people did
guess the plaintiffs’ identity, that the plaintiffs received death threats,
and that someone killed their dog.59 Santa Fe has been the scene of a
remarkable variety of attacks on religious and ethnic minorities over
52 Id. at 703 (arguing that the 40-year absence of legal challenges suggests that the public
has considered “the religious aspect of the tablets’ message as part of what is a broader moral
and historical message reflective of a cultural heritage”).
53 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
54 Id. at 42–43.
55 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690–91 (plurality opinion); id. at 703 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
56 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
57 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
58 Id. at 294–95 & n.1.
59 I know these things only because I represented the plaintiffs in the Supreme Court.
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the years.60 In a case from Little Axe, Oklahoma, involving religious
meetings in a public school, plaintiffs were harassed and their house
was burned to the ground.61
Of course Austin is not Santa Fe or Little Axe. Austin is a
university town, a far more cosmopolitan city than any small town, a
mix of southern and western with many northern immigrants, and a
politically blue oasis in a deeply red state.62 But southern social
conservatives are amply represented in and around Austin. Many of
them are mild-mannered and tolerant, and some of them—not so
much. The city is home to a deeply conservative governor and state
legislature. These things are all still true today, but Austin was a
much more conservative place for much of Justice Breyer’s forty-year
period than it is today. The generation of massive resistance retained
substantial power and influence into the 1980s. Even the university
would have been hostile for much of this period; it had an intensely
adversarial relationship with left-leaning faculty until Frank Erwin
retired from the Board of Regents in 1975.63
In 2004, when I was approached about doing the cert petition in
Van Orden, I declined. I was not afraid of retaliation against me, but I
was afraid of retaliation against the University I had served for 23
years at that point. Perhaps I was too cautious. I had represented
plaintiffs in other unpopular cases in Texas,64 and I did an amicus
brief in Van Orden.65 And while I got the occasional hate mail and
hate call, I never got much. But Van Orden just seemed too close—it
is only four blocks from the edge of campus to the edge of the capitol
complex, and the defendant was the governor instead of a city or a
local school board—and the role of the lawyer for the party is much
60 See Douglas Laycock, Voting with Your Feet Is No Substitute for Constitutional Rights,
32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 38–41 (2009).
61 See Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1397 (10th Cir. 1985)
(describing the harassment the Bells endured and noting that a suspicious fire destroyed their
home).
62 One illustration: The same-sex marriage amendment passed with 76% of the vote
statewide, and it passed by big margins in 253 out of 254 counties. In Travis County, which is
dominated by Austin, it was defeated by 60% to 40%. See Office of the Secretary of State, 2005
Constitutional Amendment Election, http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (listing countyby-county returns) (last visited Apr. 6, 2011).
63 See Mitchell Lerner, Erwin, Frank Craig, Jr., TEX. STATE HISTORICAL ASSOC.,
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fer08 (last visited Mar. 10, 2011), for a brief
biography of Erwin.
64 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (prayer at high school
football games); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (expansion of church in historic
district). Boerne aroused intense emotions only in the local community; Santa Fe aroused
intense emotions in much of the state.
65 Brief of Baptist Joint Committee and The Interfaith Alliance Foundation as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (No. 03-1500), 2004
WL 2899175.
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higher profile than the role of a lawyer for an amicus. And if we had
won, all hell would have broken loose. The real risk of retaliation is
not when you file the lawsuit, but if and when you win it. The same
prospect of political reaction that may have pressured Justice Breyer
not to provide the fifth vote for removing the monument pressured me
not to take the case. I would have loved to do that case, but I thought I
had a conflicting fiduciary duty. The bottom line is that I was
intimidated, though only indirectly.
If I had not worked for the University, I would have happily taken
the case in the Supreme Court. But suppose a potential client had
walked into my private law office at any time during Justice Breyer’s
forty-year period and said she wanted to initiate this case in the trial
court. Before agreeing to go forward, I would have had a serious
conversation with that potential client about what she was willing to
endure. Are you willing to become a household name, vilified in the
press and in the letters-to-the-editor column (or in later years, on talk
radio and the Internet)? Are you willing to have other kids call your
children names, and maybe worse? Are you willing to lose some
friendships? Will you stick it out if some of the people in your church
turn their back on you? If we start this case, are you willing to put up
with whatever happens and see it through? Because I can’t
responsibly start this case without you having some idea of what
you’re probably getting into. And I don’t want to start this case and
have you walk out on it half way through. That is a conversation that
good lawyers have with clients initiating fiercely unpopular litigation,
and it is a conversation that would certainly have been appropriate for
a client who wanted to challenge the Ten Commandments monument
in Austin.
In the actual case, the plaintiff was a homeless ex-lawyer—a
plaintiff with little left to lose—and the place where he slept was a
fiercely guarded secret. Justice Breyer’s supposition that intimidation
never deterred anyone from challenging the Texas Ten
Commandments’ monument was simply wishful thinking. But this
wishful thinking appears to have been his primary basis for inferring
that the monument’s meaning was predominantly secular and that it
was perceived as such.66
66 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment):

[A] further factor is determinative here. . . . [T]hose 40 years suggest more strongly
than can any set of formulaic tests that few individuals . . . are likely to have
understood the monument as amounting, in any significantly detrimental way, to a
government effort to favor a particular religious sect, primarily to promote religion
over nonreligion, to “engage in” any “religious practic[e],” to “compel” any
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The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Van Orden67 is of course superseded
now. But it is still worth examining, in part because it is even less
plausible than the Supreme Court’s opinions, and in part because
there is so little overlap between the reasons the two courts offered
for finding the monument primarily secular. Yet both sets of reasons
are based largely on characterizing the monument. This suggests that
the judges saw in the monument what they wanted or needed to see
more than what was there.
The Fifth Circuit found a secular purpose “to recognize and
commend a private organization [the Fraternal Order of Eagles] for its
efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency.”68 But the Fifth Circuit did not
find that the monument had an effect that achieved this purpose, and
no one on the Supreme Court mentioned a purpose or effect of
honoring the Eagles, perhaps for the very good reason that the
monument says nothing about this purpose. The monument says that
the Eagles “presented” the monument, but it does not mention their
work on juvenile delinquency, and it says nothing about the State’s
opinion of the Eagles. A 1961 legislative resolution, wholly invisible
to reasonable observers and forgotten by everyone until discovered in
the research for this case, commends the Eagles for their work on
juvenile delinquency and grants permission to erect the monument.69
But even this resolution does not say that a purpose of the monument
was to honor the Eagles; the commendation seems to be a legislative
side comment. And no matter how much it wanted to honor the
Eagles, the legislature would not have accepted the monument if it
had not approved of what the monument said. The purpose and effect
of proclaiming the Ten Commandments clearly dominated any
purpose to honor the Eagles.
The court of appeals’ discussion of secular effect largely tracked
the State’s brief, which offered a pastiche of disparate and unrelated
elements. The Ten Commandments monument is one of seventeen

“religious practic[e],” or to “work deterrence” of any “religious belief.”
Id. (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
67 Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 545 U.S. 677 (2004).
68 Id. at 178 (quoting and adopting the finding of the district court).
69 See S. Con. Res. 16 (Tex. 1961), reprinted in Joint Appendix 97, Ex. 1, Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), No. 03-1500, 2004 WL 3174744 (resolving that “the Fraternal
Order of the Eagles of the State of Texas be commended and congratulated for its efforts and
contributions in combating juvenile delinquency”).
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monuments on the capitol grounds.70 Each monument is freestanding,
spread out over twenty-two acres of grounds,71 and the Ten
Commandments monument is isolated from the others.72 The
monument has no visual relationship with any other monument; when
a person views the Ten Commandments monument, it is impossible to
see what any other monument portrays. This fact substantially
attenuates Justice Breyer’s claim, and the Fifth Circuit’s claim, that
the other monuments somehow modify the reasonably perceived
meaning of the Ten Commandments monument.
Nor is there any subject matter relationship between the Ten
Commandments and any of the other monuments. Here are the
monuments as listed in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion:
Heroes of the Alamo, Hood’s Brigade, Confederate Soldiers,
Volunteer Fireman, Terry’s Texas Rangers, Texas Cowboy,
Spanish-American War, Texas National Guard, Ten
Commandments, Tribute to Texas School Children, Texas
Pioneer Women, The Boy Scouts’ Statue of Liberty Replica,
Pearl Harbor Veterans, Korean War Veterans, Soldiers of
World War I, Disabled Veterans, and Texas Peace Officers.73
The first thing that comes to my mind is the old Sesame Street
song: “One of these things is not like the others. One of these things
just doesn’t belong.” More than half the monuments honor military
units or larger groups of veterans, and a World War II Memorial has
been added since the Court decided Van Orden.74 All but two honor
classes of people—soldiers, peace officers, volunteer firefighters,
pioneer women, children. All but one is entirely secular. (There is one
implicit pair of contrasting ideas, probably not intended as such: six

See Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 181 n.20.
See id. at 175 (describing the capital grounds).
72 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 706 (2005) (Appendices A and B to opinion of
Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (photograph showing the area around the Ten
Commandments monument and the Capitol Monument Guide, which is a map showing the
approximate location of each monument). In the United States Reports and on the Supreme
Court’s website (http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/04pdf/03-1500.pdf), the map is easily
readable, the photograph is clear, and the Ten Commandments monument is marked with a red
arrow.
73 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681 n.1 (plurality opinion). The Capitol Monument Guide lists
the Spanish-American War monument as The Hiker and the Texas National Guard as the 36th
Infantry. Id. at 706 (Appendix B to opinion of Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Those
disparities in names are explained in the description of individual monuments in Online Gallery:
Monuments Guide, TEX. STATE PRESERVATION BD., http://www.tspb.state.tx.us/spb/gallery/
MonuList/MonuList.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Monuments Guide].
74 See Monuments Guide, supra note 73 (describing the World War II Memorial as erected
in 2007).
70
71
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of the military groups honored fought for the United States, and three
fought against it.75)
The only monuments explicitly honoring ideas are the Ten
Commandments monument and a miniature replica of the Statue of
Liberty. The Ten Commandments cannot be viewed as one idea in a
forum of related and contrasting ideas; no other monument honors,
explains, questions, or disputes any belief about religion. There is no
effort to explain any alleged relationship between the Ten
Commandments and the other monuments, and I at least do not find
any such claim plausible. Justice Breyer found a theme of history and
morality;76 the Fifth Circuit found a theme of “people, ideals, and
events that compose Texan identity.”77 Chief Justice Rehnquist also
quotes this passage about Texan identity in the plurality opinion.78 If
these are sufficient themes, then the state can add religious displays
most anywhere. If most of a state’s population is Christian, then any
Christian display can be said to help illustrate the population’s
identity.
Justice Breyer’s perceived themes of history and morality might at
least be interpreted to require that religious displays explicitly
mention morality, thus excluding purely theological displays like
nativity scenes and crosses—or maybe not. None of the other
monuments offer any explicit moral teaching, but Breyer apparently
interpreted them as manifesting a moral message, perhaps through
example.
No one assembled these monuments pursuant to a theme; the
legislature accepted whatever people chose to donate over the years,
as long as the donation was politically popular.79 Justice Souter is
surely right that
17 monuments with no common appearance, history, or
esthetic rule scattered over 22 acres is not a museum, and
anyone strolling around the lawn would surely take each
memorial on its own terms and without any dawning sense
75 In addition to Confederate Soldiers, Hood’s Brigade and Terry’s Texas Rangers honor
Confederate units. Id.
76 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he
context suggests that the State intended the display’s moral message—an illustrative message
reflecting the historical ‘ideals’ of Texans—to predominate.”).
77 Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 180 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 545 U.S. 677 (2004)
(quoting H. Con. Res. 38, 77th Legis. (Tex. 2001)).
78 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681 (plurality opinion).
79 It is a criminal offense, an impeachable offense, and a ground for discharge of a state
employee, to erect a monument on the capitol grounds without the express consent of the
legislature. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2165.255 (West 2008). The capitol grounds are
emphatically not a forum.
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that some purpose held the miscellany together more
coherently than fortuity and the edge of the grass.80
Justice Souter’s view is how the State itself presents the monuments,
even in the wake of this litigation. The State’s self-guided tour of the
capitol grounds lists the monuments one by one and in geographic
groupings.81 At no point does it suggest either the theme the Fifth
Circuit perceived, the theme Justice Breyer perceived, or any other
theme.82
In addition to the seventeen (now eighteen) freestanding
monuments, there are a variety of portraits, plaques, symbols, and
historical displays inside the capitol itself. One of these is a display of
six national symbols on the floor of the rotunda, commemorating Six
Flags Over Texas, the popular slogan for the history of six
independent nations ruling Texas in turn: France, Spain, Mexico, the
Republic of Texas, the United States, and the Confederate States (at
least de facto).83 The Seal of Mexico, which is the Mexican
component of this display, includes symbols from Aztec mythology.
The State actually claimed that the Seal of Mexico was an alternate
religious display, an Aztec counterpoint to the Ten Commandments,
and the Fifth Circuit seemed to acquiesce.84
Far from providing context to the Ten Commandments, the Six
Flags display illustrates the sort of open and obvious secular meaning
that should be required to negate the apparent endorsement inherent
in a government display of religious content. It takes no long and
attenuated explanation to point out the secular content of the Six
Flags display. The Seal of Mexico is naturally integrated, without the
need for any conceptual gerrymander or strained explanations. The
Six Flags theme is explicit, not implicit; the names of the six nations
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 742–43 (Souter, J., dissenting).
The Texas Capitol Grounds: A Self-Guided Tour, TEX. STATE PRESERVATION BD. 2–3,
(1999), available at www.tspb.state.tx.us/spb/plan/images/groundswalkingtour_text.pdf (last
visited Mar. 10, 2011).
82 See id. (discussing the historical development of the grounds and the location of the
monuments, but not suggesting any relationship among the monuments).
83 For a photograph of this display, see Online Gallery: Significant Spaces, TEX. STATE
PRESERVATION BD., http://www.tspb.state.tx.us/SPB/gallery/SigSpace/rot_sm.htm. (last visited
Mar. 10, 2011). The general design of the display is visible, but much of the detail, including the
Seal of Mexico, is not discernable.
84 See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 2003) (“There is a Six Flags Over
Texas display on the floor of the Capitol Rotunda featuring the Mexican Eagle and serpent—
which as visitors will learn, is a symbol of Aztec prophecy—together with the Confederate Seal
containing the inscription ‘Deo Vindice’ (God will judge).”); id. at 180 (“The State points to the
replica of the Seal of Mexico displayed on the tour path of the Capitol, reminding that it
‘acknowledges the mystical traditions of the indigenous people of the Southwest, who were
displaced by a religious Catholic regime for some 300 years.’”).
80
81
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are spelled out in large letters in the display. A symbol of Mexico is
essential to the six-nations message of the overall display. The Seal is
a legitimate symbol of Mexico, the recurring circles of the display
better lend themselves to seals than to flags, and in any event, the
same symbols from Aztec mythology appear on the Mexican flag, so
displaying the actual flag would not change anything. The religious
content in the Mexican seal is naturally absorbed into the explicit
secular message of the Six Flags display.
The Six Flags display explicitly endorses the truth of the historic
claim that six nations have ruled Texas, and implicitly endorses the
claim that this history is a unique and romantic fact about Texas,
deserving of commemoration at the heart of the capitol. But it does
not endorse every matter incidentally necessary to presentation of the
Six Flags message. The display implies no necessary view about any
of the six nations or their chosen symbols. It displays the Bourbon
flag of the ancien régime, the French flag that actually flew over
Texas, and not the tricolor of the French Republics, but no one thinks
the State is endorsing monarchy or a restoration of the Bourbons.
Even if the religious content of the Mexican seal were more easily
recognized as religious, and even if it were a symbol of a living faith
and not an historic reference to a religion long abandoned, its
inclusion in the Six Flags display would imply nothing about the
State’s views of the religion. Needless to say, no Supreme Court
Justice adopted the Aztec-religion argument.
The Fifth Circuit also gave some weight to the State’s argument
that the state agency responsible for the capitol grounds employs
museum curators to care for the capitol's historic artifacts and its art
collection, so the grounds must be a museum.85 This argument did not
recur in the Supreme Court opinions either. These curators did not
design the Ten Commandments monument, did not determine its
content, and in fact have almost nothing to do with it. Apparently the
only decisions the curators have ever made concerning the monument
were to reinstall it and turn it around after construction of the capitol
extension in 1993.86 A professional curator who designs a display
with an explicit secular message can lend credibility to the claim that
religious material was reasonably necessary to the secular message.
But in Van Orden, the curators had no influence on the message of
the Ten Commandments monument.
After these various diversions, the Fifth Circuit at last concluded
that the secular effect of the Ten Commandments monument is based
85
86

Id. at 180–81.
See id. at 181.
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on the role of the Ten Commandments in the development of the
“laws of this country.”87 The monument’s location “on the direct line
between” the capitol and the Supreme Court building was supposed to
indicate the Commandments’ legal significance.88
There were multiple problems with this alleged secular effect—
many good reasons why this argument did not reappear in the
Supreme Court opinions. But the most fundamental problem is that
even if this message about legal development were discernable, it
would at most be a subtly implied and undeveloped message. It would
be overwhelmed by the clear and explicit message of the displayed
text of the Ten Commandments. Such a subtle and implicit secular
message cannot negate clear and explicit endorsement of a religious
message. When courts entertain claims that such subtle and implicit
alternate messages negate an explicit and obvious religious message,
they invite sham defenses and make every case litigable.
In fact, the message about legal development is not discernable at
all. Nothing in the monument’s text alludes to either the alleged legal
significance of the Commandments or to the alleged significance of
the monument’s location. It is prominently located, very close to the
capitol, and within the broad, irregularly shaped space that can be
described as between the capitol and the Supreme Court. But there is
no visible geometric relationship with architectural or symbolic
significance. The “direct line” between the capitol and the Supreme
Court exists only in imagination. On the ground, a direct line from the
north door of the capitol to the east door of the Supreme Court
building would run diagonally, cutting through hedges and
intersecting all the actual streets and sidewalks at odd angles.89
Even if there were an explicit statement that the Ten
Commandments were significant in the development of American
law, that conclusory, overbroad, and contentious statement would not
negate the endorsement of the Commandments themselves, as the
Supreme Court correctly held in Stone v. Graham.90 There are
multiple reasons for the Court’s conclusory assessment of the matter
Id.
Id.
89 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 706 (2004) (Appendices A and B to opinion of
Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (including a photograph of the Ten Commandments
Monument and the area around it (Appendix A) and a map of the monuments on the capitol
grounds (Appendix B)).
90 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that displaying the Ten Commandments
in public-school classrooms is unconstitutional, notwithstanding a notation on each display
claiming that the Ten Commandments had been adopted “as the fundamental legal code of
Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States” (quoting 1978 Ky. Acts. Ch.
436 § 1) (effective June 17, 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
87
88
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in Stone: space, prominence, context, and inaccuracy all contributed
to the clear impression that the display of the Ten Commandments in
Stone was a display of the Commandments, with a comment about the
development of law. It was not a display about the development of
law, with the Commandments as an illustration.
In Stone, the Commandments were far more prominent than the
explanation about legal development, which appeared at the bottom in
small print. In Van Orden, there was not even a conclusory statement
about legal development; the monument did not mention legal
development. Nothing on, with, or near the Commandments suggests
a display on the development of American law.
Finally, the claim that the display of the Commandments is about
the development of American law is belied by its inaccuracy. This
requires further elaboration. To say that the Ten Commandments
exercised “extraordinary influence” on American law91 is to wrap a
kernel of truth in such a vast overstatement as to demonstrate that the
statement can only be a pretext to justify displaying the
Commandments. What is plausibly true is that three of the Ten
Commandments are an early example of prohibitions on homicide,
theft, and false witness (now embodied in the law of perjury and
defamation), and that the Commandments have been more visible
than other ancient sources because they are part of the sacred text of
the dominant religious tradition in Western culture. To claim any
more than that is to rewrite history.
Widely accepted religious teachings provide moral support for
corresponding legal prohibitions. But that is a religious effect of the
Commandments, akin to the argument that a religious people will be
better and more law-abiding citizens. It is not an argument that any
existing legal rules are derived from the Commandments.
American law does not trace in any significant way to the Ten
Commandments. Paul Finkelman reached this conclusion by
examining the sources Americans have cited in the development of
American law; we did not cite the Ten Commandments.92 I
approached the question somewhat differently, asking when and
where the prohibitions contained in the Commandments entered the
law. Penalties for murder, theft, perjury, and defamation tend to
appear early in the development of all legal systems, including those
of ancient civilizations with no reliance on the Jewish scriptures.93
See Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 181.
See Finkelman, supra note 33, at 1500–16.
93 See generally RUSS VERSTEEG, LAW IN THE ANCIENT WORLD (2002) (examining the
law and legal institutions of ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, and Rome); see also id. at
60–65, 68, 77 (describing homicide, theft, false witness, perjury, and defamation in ancient
91
92
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The American states inherited prohibitions on murder, theft, perjury,
and defamation from English law. Such rules appear in the earliest
surviving sources of English law, the “dooms” of seventh-century
Anglo-Saxon kings.94 These dooms compiled pre-existing customs;
the substance of these laws existed among the Germanic tribes before
they were written down and before the Anglo-Saxons were
Christianized.95 The American law of murder, theft, perjury, and
defamation thus traces back through centuries of English law to the
barbarian laws of non-Christian Germanic tribes—and this line of
development is far more direct than any development from the Ten
Commandments. The comprehensive standard sources—Holdsworth,
Plucknett, and Pollock & Maitland—have no index entries for the Ten
Commandments, and in extensive reading on early English law in
those sources, I have encountered not a single mention of the Ten
Commandments.
Of course, the Christianization of England contributed ideas that
influenced law. But these ideas were nothing so basic as the points of
overlap between secular law and the Ten Commandments.
Holdsworth emphasizes the church’s contribution of more advanced
legal ideas derived from secular Roman law, not from religious
faith.96 The idea of writing down tribal laws and customs was itself
one of these Roman ideas; thus the dooms first appear after

Mesopotamia); id. at 134–35, 165–69, 172–73 (describing perjury, theft, homicide, and
defamation in ancient Egypt); id. at 216–17, 243–48, 254–55 (describing perjury, homicide,
theft, and defamation offenses in ancient Athens); id. at 299, 334–37, 345–46, 347 (describing
perjury, homicide, theft, and elements of defamation in pre-Christian Roman law).
94 See SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 1–10 (1937) (Carl Stephenson &
Frederick George Marcham, eds.) (reprinting excerpts from the dooms). There are many
provisions penalizing homicide and theft; for perjury and defamation, see id. at 5 (Dooms of
Hlothaere and Eadric &11). For analysis, see 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 52–53, 55–56 (2d
ed. 1968) (describing the Anglo-Saxon law of homicide and theft); 2 id. at 537 (describing the
Anglo-Saxon law of defamation); 1 id. at 39–40 (describing heavy reliance on oaths in AngloSaxon law); 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 105 (4th ed. 1936)
(describing the Anglo-Saxon penalties for false accusations); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 483 (5th ed. 1956) (describing the Anglo-Saxon law
of slander).
95 See 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 94, at 19 (stating that Anglo-Saxon codes, which is
what he calls the dooms, “enacted the customary law of the tribe”); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
supra note 94, at 44 (“[I]n its general features, Anglo-Saxon law is not only archaic, but offers
an especially pure type of Germanic archaism.”). This Anglo-Saxon base persisted in English
law after the Conquest. Pollock & Maitland conclude that “our laws have been formed in the
main from a stock of Teutonic customs, with some additions of matter, and considerable
additions or modifications of form received directly or indirectly from the Roman system.” Id.
at c.
96 See 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 94, at 21–25.
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conversion to Christianity.97 Plucknett attributes to the influence of
Christianity and its Jewish inheritance the concept of individual
responsibility, holding individuals rather than families responsible for
wrongdoing.98 But the basic ideas that it was wrong to kill, steal, or
bear false witness were part of Anglo-Saxon law long before the
Anglo-Saxons learned of the Ten Commandments.
The Commandment forbidding adultery corresponds to legal rules
that survive in American law only vestigially. Adultery is a ground
for divorce that is rarely used in the age of no-fault divorce, and in a
few states, it is still a crime, frequently committed but never
prosecuted. Many Americans believe adultery to be immoral and
destructive, but few Americans want any serious effort to criminally
prosecute adulterers. The Commandment against adultery has thus
become a religious and moral obligation with little remaining
relationship to law. And at any rate, adultery too was prohibited in
many early legal systems unrelated to the Ten Commandments,
including that of the Anglo-Saxons.99
The Commandments against coveting, and the Commandment to
honor one’s father and mother, are religious and moral obligations
that have never been legal obligations in Anglo-American law. A
cynic might conclude that our national economic policy is based on
encouraging people to covet what their neighbors have and to run out
and buy something like it—or better. The remaining Commandments,
and the promise of divine reward for honoring one's father and
mother, could not constitutionally be part of American law. These are
purely religious teachings, concerning each person's relationship to
God.
In sum, only three of the Commandments are a significant part of
American law, and those three provisions were part of the law of
England before England learned of the Commandments. Why would
a state pick out this single text, with at best a loose and ill-fitting
relationship to the law, to illustrate the development of American
law? Of course it would not. Governments display this text for its
religious significance, not for its legal significance.
By attributing to the Commandments a legal significance they do
not have, the state inflates the importance of the Commandments to
citizens who do not believe in either Christianity or Judaism. And by
emphasizing this false source of significance, the state necessarily
See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 94, at 11–12.
See PLUCKNETT, supra note 94, at 8–9.
99 See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 94, at 392–93, 543–44 & n.1; 2
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 94, at 90.
97
98
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distorts and conceals the Commandments’ true significance in the
faiths that hold them sacred.
No justice appeared to credit the sources-of-American-law
argument in Van Orden, but the dissenters gave it some credence in
the companion case, McCreary County v. ACLU.100 McCreary County
had displayed the Commandments with a miscellany of other legal,
historic, or patriotic documents—Magna Carta, the Declaration of
Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the Star Spangled
Banner, the Mayflower Compact, the Preamble to the Kentucky
Constitution, and a picture of Lady Justice—and labeled the whole
array “The Foundations of American Law and Government
Display.”101 The topic announced in that label is clearly secular, and
the county insisted that the Ten Commandments were just an integral
part of this secular display. The majority found this display lacking in
any “clear theme,” and the choices for inclusion “odd,” “puzzl[ing],”
and pretextual.102 The Constitution does not require that governmentsponsored secular displays make any sense, but when a religious
display is surrounded by a secular display that was hastily thrown
together, fails to cohere, and asserts legal or historical claims that
make little or no sense, the incoherence or inaccuracy of the secular
content supports an inference that no one took the secular content
seriously and that it is just a pretext for the religious display.
Despite all this, the dissenters appeared to credit the Foundations
of American Law theme.103 Why in McCreary County but not in Van
Orden? Perhaps because in Van Orden, Texas did not even bother
with the pretext. The display itself said nothing to connect the Ten
Commandments to the development of American law, and apparently,
no justice was willing to say that the Commandments inherently
presented that unstated and implausible theme.
C.

Summing Up

In the view of various judges, a freestanding display of the text of
the Ten Commandments is predominantly secular either because the
Commandments were made part of a theme of history and morality,
or because they were made part of a theme of Texan identity, or
100 545

U.S. 844 (2005).
at 856.
102 Id. at 872–73 (“If the observer had not thrown up his hands, he would probably suspect
that the Counties were simply reaching for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of
the courthouses constitutionally required to embody religious neutrality.”).
103 See id. at 903–06 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“the context communicates that the Ten
Commandments are included, not to teach their binding nature as a religious text, but to show
their unique contribution to the development of the legal system.”).
101 Id.
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because they have an historical meaning, or because they have a
museum curator, or because they show the development of American
law, or because together with a display on Aztec mythology they
comprise a display on comparative religion. Reasonable people can
disagree about whether some of these diverse and inconsistent
arguments would have at least a bit of plausibility in isolation. But
none of these proposed meanings can begin to compete with the open
and obvious religious meaning of sacred text presented as the voice of
God speaking directly to the reader. If no one were desperately trying
to rationalize governmental display of the Ten Commandments, no
one would entertain the notion that they are somehow predominantly
secular.
IV. THE CROSS
One might think that surely everyone agrees that the Christian
cross is religious. But one would be wrong. Government lawyers have
repeatedly argued that the cross can have a predominantly secular
meaning, and sometimes judges seem to take them seriously.
The Supreme Court has not yet squarely addressed this issue.
Salazar v Buono104 involved a freestanding cross in the Mojave
National Preserve in California. But the Ninth Circuit had held that
the cross was unconstitutional, in a judgment that was not appealed.105
So the constitutionality of the cross on government property was res
judicata in Buono.106 The issue presented was whether the
government’s efforts to privatize the cross were a sufficient remedy
for the adjudicated constitutional violation, or in the Court’s
somewhat different formulation, whether those efforts should be
enjoined.107
Litigators try to make good impressions even on issues that are not
presented, and the government’s brief repeatedly implied that maybe
the cross wasn’t unconstitutional after all. Thus, the government said
that many people view the cross “as a symbol of the sacrifices of
fallen soldiers,” contrasting this characterization with plaintiff’s view
that the cross is “a religious symbol.”108 The government compared
the cross to the Ten Commandments display in Van Orden and
claimed that the cross “communicates a secular message.”109 The
104 130

S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004).
106 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1815 (plurality opinion).
107 Id. at 1811.
108 Brief for the Petitioners 28, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472),
2009 WL 1526915.
109 Id. at 29.
105 Buono
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government even claimed that the cross has “a predominantly secular
message.”110 The government contrasted the cross with the “patently
religious” object of the ordinance in McCreary County, implying that
the government’s purpose in preferentially permitting erection of a
Christian cross was somehow not patently religious.111
Justice Kennedy for the plurality acknowledged that the cross is
“certainly a Christian symbol.”112 He even quoted his earlier
statement, dissenting in a nativity scene case, that the Establishment
Clause “forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large
Latin cross on the roof of city hall.”113 But he appeared to think that
the clause may not forbid the government to permit the permanent
erection of a large Latin cross if those who erect the cross say that it is
a memorial to veterans. He said that “the cross was not emplaced on
Sunrise Rock to promote a Christian message. . . . Rather, those who
erected the cross intended simply to honor our Nation’s fallen
soldiers.”114 “[T]he District Court concentrated solely on the religious
aspects of the cross, divorced from its background and context.”115
This appears to be a new extension of the larger-unit argument. In
the nativity scene cases, the larger-unit argument at least required that
there actually be a larger unit—some secular content in addition to the
nativity scene itself. This is the difference between Lynch v.
Donnelly,116 with its nativity scene, reindeer, and candy canes, and
County of Allegheny v. ACLU,117 where the nativity scene stood alone.
In the Pledge of Allegiance case,118 there was secular text in addition
to “under God,” and in the case upholding a Ten Commandments
monument,119 there were the Commandments with secular equivalents
(no killing, stealing, or bearing false witness). But in Buono, there
was just a freestanding cross. There had once been a small sign
describing it as a memorial to veterans, but that sign had
disappeared.120 The sign had never been visible from the road, which
is the point from which the great majority of people view the cross.
110 Id.

(emphasis added).
at 36.
112 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1816.
113 Id. (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
114 Id. at 1816–17.
115 Id. at 1820.
116 465 U.S. 668 (1984). For further analysis, see supra notes 5–10, and accompanying
text.
117 492 U.S. 573 (1989). For further analysis, see supra notes 21–23, and accompanying
text.
118 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
119 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
120 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1812.
111 Id.
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So the religious symbol might not even need to be part of a larger
display. To justify disregarding the religious content, it might be
enough that the religious symbol has some allegedly secular
secondary meaning. If the cross is used to honor fallen soldiers, its
religious meaning may be subsumed.
These claims cannot withstand analysis. There is no ambiguity
about the primary meaning of a Christian cross. The cross is the
central symbol of the central theological claim of Christianity: that
the son of God died on the cross to redeem the sins of humankind,
that he rose from the dead, and that those who believe in him will also
rise from the dead and have eternal life. This is the second of the two
miracles around which Christianity is organized. And while there
could be no death and resurrection without the Incarnation, there
could be no salvation and eternal life in the Christian story without
the cross and resurrection. Christmas leads toward Easter, not the
other way around. There is no doubt that the resurrection is the more
important of the two miracles to the Christian story.
All the secondary meanings to which the cross has been put are
derived from, and dependent on, this primary meaning. The
secondary meanings would make no sense without the primary
meaning. Why does the cross honor deceased Christian soldiers?
Because it symbolizes the promise that they will rise from the dead
and live forever. To say that the cross honors the Christian dead is not
to identify a secular meaning of the cross; it is merely to identify a
common application of the religious meaning of the cross.
The cross should be a much easier case than the Ten
Commandments. The Ten Commandments are a sacred text, but as
Justice Breyer emphasized, this text contains prohibitions on murder,
theft, perjury, and defamation—secular wrongs that are prohibited in
the legal code of every civilization. But the Christian cross has no
meaning not derived from its primary religious meaning.
The conservative justices who most strongly defend government
sponsorship of religion have said on two occasions that this support
must be interfaith. It must be confined to what the three Abrahamic
faiths have in common;121 it must exclude “details upon which men
and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and
Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example, the divinity of
Christ).”122
121 See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893–94 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that government cannot favor one religion over another, but arguing that with
respect to government speech, this principal protects only Christians, Muslims, and Jews, or
perhaps only monotheists).
122 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The cross fails each of these proposed tests. It is unique to
Christianity and not common to the three Abrahamic religions, let
alone all monotheistic religions. Its power as a symbol, and the story
it symbolizes, are entirely dependent on the divinity of Jesus. The
divinity of Jesus is an explicit, central, and essential element of the
Christian story of the cross. The promise of resurrection and eternal
life is what makes the cross a symbol that honors deceased Christian
soldiers, and that promise necessarily depends on the divinity of
Jesus. But even Justice Scalia has said that “our constitutional
tradition” has “ruled out of order” such sectarian endorsements of
religion.123
Or maybe not, when necessary to uphold a symbol that cannot
rationally be characterized as interfaith. At the oral argument in
Buono, Justice Scalia said he assumed the cross “is erected in honor
of all the war dead. It’s the—the cross is the—is the most common
symbol of—of—of the resting place of the dead.”124 He thought it
“outrageous” to believe that the cross honors only the Christian war
dead,125 and he ridiculed the possibility of erecting symbols of
multiple faiths to honor the dead.126
These are comments that can be made only from deep inside a
Christian worldview. Unthinking Christians may intend a cross to
honor all the war dead, but that does not create any sensible theory by
which the cross actually honors non-Christians.
The cross and its story are not merely neutral or irrelevant to nonChristians; they are profoundly negative. To Christians, the story of
the cross offers an extraordinary promise: Christians will be “saved”
through the cross,127 resurrected from the dead, and eternally
rewarded. But to non-Christians, the cross offers an equally
extraordinary threat. According to the central Christian claim that is
symbolized by the cross, non-Christians are outside the saving grace
of the cross and will be eternally damned.
The promise to Christians is capsulized in a Bible verse much
publicized by evangelical Christians: “For God so loved the world,
that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him
should not perish, but have everlasting life.”128 The negative pregnant
123 Id.
124 Transcript of Oral Argument 38-39, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08472), 2009 WL 3197881.
125 Id. at 39.
126 Id. (“[W]hat would you have them erect? A cross—some conglomerate of a cross, a
Star of David, and you know, a Muslim half moon and star?”).
127 See John 3:17 (King James) (“For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the
world; but that the world through him might be saved.”).
128 Id. 3:16.
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in this promise is made explicit two verses later (and in many other
New Testament passages): “He that believeth on him is not
condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already, because
he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God.”129
The threat of the cross is inseparable from the use of the cross to
honor the Christian dead. The cross is an appropriate symbol for
Christian dead because it promises resurrection and eternal life. But
that promise is only to some, and it is paired with a threat of
condemnation to all others. Christians have disagreed over the
centuries about how this sorting process works—predestination, a
“personal decision” for Jesus, faithful and sincere performance of
sacramental obligations, and other theories—but those disagreements
do not affect the central point. On any version of Christian theology,
some humans get the promise, and other humans get the threat. To
note these things about the meaning of the cross is not to attack
Christianity, but to take it seriously.
Non-Christians do not fear the threat of the cross, because they do
not believe the Christian story. But that does not justify government
promotion of the principal symbol of both the promise and the threat.
A government-sponsored cross inherently takes sides between
competing claims to religious truth. It says that Christian teachings
about the afterlife are true, and that the teachings of other faiths are
therefore, necessarily, false. It says that Christian soldiers will be
eternally rewarded, and that other soldiers, who also gave their lives
for the country, will be eternally damned.
No doubt many Americans look at the cross without thinking
about all these things. It is common to think of the simplest meaning
of a word or symbol without thinking of how that meaning came to be
or why that meaning makes sense. Many Christians believe that the
offer of the cross is open to all humans even if many decline to accept
it. And many American Christians are rather nominal Christians who
do not take Christian teaching very seriously, think about it very
deeply, or even know much about it.130
But none of that should be taken to change the meaning of a
symbol that literally makes no sense apart from the theological claims
from which the meaning is derived. The cross was not arbitrarily
129 Id. 3:18; see, e.g., Mark 16:16 (“[H]e that believeth not shall be damned.”); John 3:36
(“[H]e that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him.”); id. 14:6
(“I am the way the truth and the Life; no man cometh unto the father, but by me.”).
130 See Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, U.S. Religious Knowledge Survey (Sept. 28,
2010), http://www.pewforum.org/Other-Beliefs-and-Practices/U-S-Religious-KnowledgeSurvey.aspx (finding that Americans on average could correctly answer about half of a series of
multiple choice questions about religion—questions that for the most part were not difficult or
esoteric).
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assigned to honor the dead; if that were all, a division sign would
work as well as a modified plus sign. The cross honors the dead
because of—and only because of—the promise of the resurrection. It
makes no sense otherwise. And the promise of the resurrection is also
a threat of damnation to those who do not believe the promise.
If, as I believe and the Ninth Circuit held, the cross in the Mojave
National Preserve is unconstitutional, it does not follow that every
cross on government property is unconstitutional. Many of these
crosses are constitutionally unobjectionable, even praiseworthy—not
because they are somehow secular, but because they are
predominantly private speech. The crosses on the headstones, and the
crosses used as headstones, on military graves in government
cemeteries, are chosen by individual veterans or their families, and
the government offers a wide range of symbols for use by veterans of
other faiths.131 These privately selected religious symbols on
individual graves are best understood as the private speech of each
veteran.
One important function of religion is to address the inevitability of
death, and a cemetery is an appropriate place to express the religious
faiths of those buried there. Without some such ability to express their
faith, many Americans would find government cemeteries unusable.
The objection is not to religious symbols in cemeteries, but to the
inequality of singling out only Christians for collective
memorialization.
Whether in such a cemetery, with individual religious markers for
veterans of different faiths, there can also be a large, dominant cross
in honor of Christian veterans collectively is a harder question. Such
crosses exist in government cemeteries, although they are not
common.132 A cross is an appropriate part of a cemetery with large
numbers of Christian burials, and if the government is to run
cemeteries, it can build crosses. But such a freestanding cross for
Christian veterans collectively should be accompanied by prominent
collective monuments for adherents of other faiths. If government is
to erect collective religious symbols in cemeteries, it must treat all
faiths—and the lack of faith—with equal concern and respect.
The site of the cross at issue in Buono is not a cemetery, there are
no individual headstones with symbols of many faiths, and the
131 See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1823 n.9 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (noting that veterans and their families may choose from thirty-nine
types of headstones).
132 See Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1111–16 (9th Cir. 2011) (surveying
American military cemeteries’ grave markers and concluding that “the cross is not commonly
used as a symbol to commemorate veterans and fallen soldiers in the United States”).

2/4/2011 2:14:16 PM

2011]

GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS

1243

government refused to permit the symbols of any faith other than
Christianity.133 What stands at that site is a large, permanent, and
freestanding cross, isolated from the symbol of any other faith and
from any secular symbol.134 There is no way that display can be
understood as a neutral recognition of veterans of all faiths. Rather,
for government to sponsor such a cross is for government to promote
the Christian story of the cross.
Other cross cases are on their way to the Court. In American
Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan,135 the Tenth Circuit struck down a program
of large crosses placed near highways to memorialize state troopers
killed in the line of duty. These crosses are twelve-feet tall, much
larger than the small privately placed crosses often seen at the site of
fatal accidents, and they have a large copy of the insignia of the
highway patrol (12 x 16 inches) where the vertical and horizontal
members of the cross intersect.136 These crosses are indisputably
religious symbols, and their use to memorialize deceased troopers is
derivative of their religious meaning. An interesting wrinkle, in my
view legally irrelevant, is that the Mormon majority in Utah does not
use the cross as a significant religious symbol.137 Mormons of course
believe the central Christian story and believe in the resurrection,138
but they view the cross as a symbol of Jesus’ suffering and death
rather than as a symbol of the resurrection.139
The difficult issue in American Atheists is whether the religious
message inherent in these crosses should be attributed to the
individual troopers and their families, to the state, or to both. The
Utah Highway Patrol Association, which erects these crosses in state
rights-of-way with the state’s permission, says it would use a different
symbol for any trooper whose family requested a different symbol.140
But the defendant state officials—whether out of intransigent
intolerance or to create a test case is unclear—say that they would not
grant permission for any other symbol.141 That open discrimination
133 Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205–06 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 371 F.3d 543
(9th Cir. 2004).
134 Id. (describing the site).
135 616 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2010), modified on reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 2010 WL
5151630 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2010).
136 Id. at 1150.
137 See id. at 1157.
138 See RICHARD LYMAN BUSHMAN, MORMONISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 3
(2008).
139 Gordon B. Hinckley, The Symbol of Christ, NEW ERA 4 (Apr. 1990), available at
http://lds.org/new-era/1990/04/the-symbol-of-christ?lang=eng (“But for us, the cross is the
symbol of the dying Christ, while our message is a declaration of the living Christ.”).
140 Am. Atheists, 616 F.3d at 1151.
141 Id. at 1151 n.2.
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between faiths should be clearly unconstitutional. But it is hard to be
confident that the Court would say so. The Tenth Circuit was also
troubled by the large size, both of the crosses and the state insignia on
the crosses,142 which could reasonably be viewed as the state going
out of its way to associate itself with the religious symbol (even if all
discrimination were eliminated).
In Trunk v. City of San Diego,143 the Ninth Circuit held that a large
freestanding cross at the top of Mount Soledad in La Jolla is
unconstitutional. This cross was erected in 1954, replacing earlier
crosses dating back to 1913.144 The cross was not presented as a war
memorial until after litigation began,145 and the cross towers over the
much smaller objects that have been added to honor individual
veterans and military units.146 This cross is clearly a religious symbol,
and in my judgment, it is clearly unconstitutional. But the plurality in
Buono gave great weight to the political problems caused by
removing a longstanding cross, and we may expect those justices to
be troubled by removing this cross too. It would be far better if they
would just say that and stop, rather than absurdly claiming that the
cross has a predominantly secular meaning.
V.

THE TURN TO POST MODERNISM

The Court carried the assault on meaning to a whole new level in
Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum.147 The Court said that monuments often have many
meanings, not just one; they can be interpreted “in a variety of
ways.”148 There is something to this, especially when the monument
is nonverbal, cryptic, or conspicuously ambiguous. It is also a point
easily exaggerated, as the Court’s examples illustrate. “[W]hat is ‘the
message’ of the ‘large bronze statue displaying the word “peace” in
many world languages’ that is displayed in Fayetteville,
Arkansas?”149 There is simply no ambiguity there. The dominant
message is “peace,” and any other message is distinctly secondary.
What about a statue of Pancho Villa, donated by the government
of Mexico to the City of Tucson? Was Villa a revolutionary leader

142 Id.

at 1160–62.
F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2011).
144 Id. at 1102–03.
145 Id. at 1119.
146 Id. at 1123.
147 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
148 Id. at 1135.
149 Id.
143 629
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and advocate for the poor, or a violent bandit?150 Unless there is an
epitaph or a biographical inscription, the statue doesn’t say. The
statue is nonverbal. But the statue unambiguously honors Pancho
Villa, and absent some disclaimer, it is an unavoidable inference that
those who erect and maintain such a statute think him deserving of
the honor. That implies a favorable view of Villa, with details left
unspecified.
The Court notes that the Statue of Liberty was originally perceived
as a monument to Franco-American friendship, and only later came to
be viewed as a welcoming beacon to immigrants.151 This example
works a little better, but it depends both on the statue’s original lack
of text and on a culture clash rather like that involved in the Mexican
and American views of Pancho Villa. The symbolism intended by the
French was never accepted in the United States,152 which had
considerable difficulty raising money to pay for the pedestal on which
the statute stands.153 It was inevitable that Americans would impose
their own meaning on the statue. The beacon-to-immigrants meaning
emerged quickly; the famous Emma Lazarus poem was written in
1883, well before the statue was unveiled in October 1886.154 The
immigration meaning was locked in when the poem was added to the
pedestal in 1903.155 This story has not just a shift from one culture to
another, but also a substantial addition of text to the display.156
150 Id.

at 1135–36.
at 1136–37 (“The statue was given to this country by the Third French Republic to
express republican solidarity and friendship between the two countries.”).
152 See MARVIN TRACHTENBERG, THE STATUE OF LIBERTY 181 (1976) (“the colossus was
motivated by a unique set of political and cultural conditions in the ascendant French Third
Republic. But there was no historical reason—beyond some vague Centennial sentiment—why
a reciprocal spirit should have possessed the Americans . . .”); id. at 186 (For the Americans,
there was no profit in maintaining the symbolism of international revolution (even on the
intended moderate terms of the ‘conservative [French] republicans’). Few among the American
public wished to be reminded of the frailty of the thirteen colonies in 1776, and how they had
welcomed aid from a mighty nation that had since grown soft. And certainly whatever was
sensed of the imperialist French undertones of the statue was felt as abhorrent.”).
153 Congress refused to appropriate money, the governor of New York vetoed a state
appropriation, and “the public was as ungenerous as its elected representatives.” Id. at 179.
Successful fundraising eventually required an intensive publicity campaign organized by Joseph
Pulitzer, who published the name of every donor in the New York World. Id. at 183–84.
154 Id. at 187 (date of poem); id. at 21 (date of unveiling).
155 Id. at 187.
156 Welcome to immigrants is the theme of the entire poem, and not just its most famous
lines:
151 Id.

Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame,
With conquering limbs astride from land to land;
Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand
A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name
Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand

2/4/2011 2:14:16 PM

1246

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4

The Pancho Villa and Statue of Liberty examples do illustrate the
Court’s most immediate claim—that the donor and recipient of a
donated monument may attach different meanings to it. But even that
point is illustrated only in the narrow circumstances of a monument
without words and donated from one nation to another that spoke a
different language and had a very different culture.
The Court’s final example was the John Lennon memorial in
Central Park, at the center of which is the single word, “Imagine.”157
The Court says that some may imagine the songs Lennon would have
written if he had lived; “[o]thers may think of the lyrics of the Lennon
song that obviously inspired the mosaic and may ‘imagine’ a world
without religion, countries, possessions, greed, or hunger.”158 The
Court’s “obviously” may have been a slip of the word processor, but
it is entirely accurate; it is indeed obvious what inspired this part of
the memorial. Like the Ten Commandments displays with tablets and
a couple of words, but without a full text, this memorial alludes to the
text but does not present the text. The text itself, imagining what a
better world this would be if there were no religion and no belief in
heaven or hell,159 is not one that any government in the United States
could constitutionally endorse. The dominant meaning of the John
Lennon memorial is to honor John Lennon; the means chosen are
inappropriate and constitutionally dubious. Whether it should be
upheld depends on whether the courts ultimately uphold similar
allusions to pro-religious texts.
The Court’s musings about these disparate monuments were
apparently intended to illustrate the claim, never quite explicitly
stated, that the City could adopt a Ten Commandments monuments as
government speech without adopting or endorsing the Ten
Commandments that appeared on the face of the monument.160 A Ten

Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command
The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame.
“Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!” cries she
With silent lips. “Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.”
Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, in 2 AMERICAN POETRY: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 457–
58 (John Hollander, ed., 1993).
157 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1135 (2009).
158 Id. (emphasis added).
159 See id. at 1135 n.2 (reprinting text of JOHN LENNON, IMAGINE (Apple Records 1971)).
160 See id. at 1135 (“Respondent seems to think that a monument can convey only one
‘message’ . . . and that, if a government entity that accepts a monument for placement on its
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Commandments monument can have many possible meanings, of
which the actual Ten Commandments is only one.161 This from a
Justice who said the same Term that the statutory meaning of a RICO
“enterprise” is so clear that “there is no need to reach petitioner’s
remaining arguments based on statutory purpose, legislative history,
or the rule of lenity.”162 Of course, unlike the Court’s four examples
of allegedly ambiguous monuments, both the RICO Act and the Ten
Commandments monuments in Van Orden, McCreary County, and
Summum use complete English sentences to convey their meaning.
Some English sentences are ambiguous, but some are quite clear, or
clear on one point even if ambiguous on some other point.
The opinion’s claims about the inherent ambiguity of monuments
are in sharp tension with its more credible explanation of why
monuments on government land are government speech:
Governments have long used monuments to speak to the
public. . . . A monument, by definition, is a structure that is
designed as a means of expression. When a government
entity arranges for the construction of a monument, it does so
because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some
feeling in those who see the structure. . . .
It certainly is not common for property owners to open up
their property for the installation of permanent monuments
that convey a message with which they do not wish to be
associated. And because property owners typically do not
permit the construction of such monuments on their land,
persons who observe donated monuments routinely—and
reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on
the property owner’s behalf.163
Government would not use monuments to communicate if they did
not actually communicate at least much of the time. If every
monument were as indecipherable as the Court seems to think in part
IV of its opinion, then the practice of erecting monuments to convey
meanings, described in part III of the opinion, would be largely futile.

property does not formally embrace that message, then the government has not engaged in
expressive conduct.”).
161 See id. (“Even when a monument features the written word, the monument may be
intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety of
ways.”).
162 Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2246 (2009).
163 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132–33.
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Part IV seems designed to increase the range of deniability for
governments that sponsor religious monuments. Monuments mean
lots of things, and just because this one is religious on its face does
not mean that government endorses the religious meaning.
Summum was an implausible free speech claim, unanimously
rejected. It was not an Establishment Clause case, and the Court’s
church-state separationists did not object to part IV of the opinion.
That was probably a mistake. Justice Alito returned to the theme in
his separate opinion in the cross case, Salazar v. Buono.164 Citing
Summum for the point that “‘The meaning conveyed by a monument
is generally not a simple one,’ and a monument may be ‘interpreted
by different observers, in a variety of ways,’” Justice Alito said that
observers had interpreted the cross in Buono “as conveying at least
two significantly different messages.”165 No one else joined in this
opinion.
No doubt an ambiguous text or symbol can be subject to more than
one interpretation. But not every text is ambiguous. Surely the Court
in Summum did not commit itself without dissent to a post-modernist
world in which no text or symbol has any core meaning and any text
can mean anything. When a symbol has a primary meaning so
fundamental, so longstanding, and so universally known, as the
Christian cross, government cannot display the symbol and plausibly
disclaim the primary meaning. When the allegedly secular secondary
meaning (honoring the war dead) is wholly derivative from the
primary religious meaning (the promise of the resurrection),
government cannot embrace the secondary meaning without
embracing the primary meaning on which the secondary meaning
depends. If government can sponsor a Christian cross and deny that it
has done something that is first, foremost, and fundamentally
religious, then words and symbols have no meaning, and the Court
has consigned the Establishment Clause to the world of Alice in
Wonderland.
If a Christian cross has sufficient secular meaning to fall outside
the Establishment Clause, then so might a sectarian prayer. Some
might interpret the prayer as a meditation, some as a prose poem, and
still others as a metaphor, and some might view the prayer as
“[r]eligious symbolism . . . with the same mental reservations one has
in teaching of Santa Claus or Uncle Sam or Easter bunnies or
dispassionate judges.”166 Especially if the prayer includes some
164 130

S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
at 1822 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135).
166 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 94 (1944) (Jackson, J. dissenting).
165 Id.
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secular message or request, there is no limit. Some observers will
emphasize the secular request, and some might apply the larger-unit
theory—if there is secular material in this prayer, then the whole unit
can be labeled as secular. If the message of the cross is
“predominantly secular,” why not “Jesus Christ save the United
States and this Honorable Court”?167 If government can use a single
sacred symbol to honor the war dead, and a sacred text to encourage
morality, why not religious exhortations more generally to encourage
good behavior? The Court will disserve both religion and the
Constitution if it eventually accepts the claim that even the most
profoundly religious symbols have no core meaning and can be
treated as secular.
VI. TAKING WORDS AND SYMBOLS AT FACE VALUE
The Court got it right in part III of its opinion in Summum.168
Neither government nor private citizens very often erect signs they
disagree with, and observers have no way to recognize the rare
exceptions unless the disagreement is made clear.
This commonplace factual inference should support a legal
presumption: government display of a sacred text presumptively
endorses the religious message in that text, and the burden is on
government to clearly rebut the presumption of endorsement with
objective evidence at the site of the display, open and obvious to all
observers, and sufficient to unambiguously control the dominant
meaning of the display. The endorsement of the displayed text is
open, obvious, and difficult to plausibly deny. The evidence that
overcomes that apparent endorsement must therefore be equally open
and obvious, and it must be strong enough to objectively outweigh the
message of endorsement.
Displays of religious symbols may sometimes be more ambiguous
than displays of religious texts, but well-known religious symbols
have primary religious meanings that cannot plausibly be denied.
Government must be taken to endorse the religious symbols it
displays, and in the exceptional cases where that is not true,
government must clearly say so, at the site of the display, and in terms
that are open and obvious to all observers and strong enough to
objectively negate the apparent endorsement.
167 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (No. 901014), 1991 WL 636285 (where an unidentified Justice, who sounds very much like Justice
Scalia, seems to think this would be constitutionally problematic).
168 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132–34 (2009) (explaining that
governments erect monuments to speak to the public).
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The most common way in which a sacred text or symbol becomes
part of a secular message is when it is an integral part of a larger and
non-pretextual secular message or display. The incorporation of Aztec
symbols on the Seal of Mexico into the Six Flags display in the Texas
capitol is an example. But the point is not confined to dead religions.
Consider how the Ten Commandments would be presented in a
secular museum display designed by a professional curator, or in a
curricular unit designed by a professional teacher—assuming that
neither was committed to evading the state’s obligations under the
Establishment Clause, and that neither was pressured by superiors
demanding such evasion. In such a context, the Commandments
would not be presented by themselves. They would be an integral part
of some larger pattern, and the larger display or curricular unit would
convey information in no way dependent on whether observers or
students believed the Commandments. Such a display might survey
ancient moral codes or lawgivers through history. It might be a
comparative survey of the world’s great religions. It might be part of
a history of the Jewish people. It might be many things, but it would
not be a bare display of the sacred text. Other texts or objects would
be included, and there would be explicit explanations of the
relationship among the various items included. There would be a
coherent pattern to the combination, not dependent on the religious
significance of the sacred text.
Neither lawyers nor expert witnesses would be needed to explain
the secular point of such a display, because the whole display would
be designed to convey its secular point. The secular point would be
open and obvious, and the sacred text would be a natural component,
necessary to the display.
Justice O’Connor once said that “a typical museum setting, though
not neutralizing the religious content of a religious painting, negates
any message of endorsement of that content.”169 This is no doubt true,
but why? It is true because the museum context makes clear that the
painting is there because of its value as art, not because of its
religious message. This is clear because there are many other
paintings, because all of them have substantial value as art, and
usually, because not all of them are religious. But even in a museum
devoted to a period when substantially all art was religious, the
reasonable observer could see that selections were based on artistic
value.
Similarly in the case of a display or curricular unit conveying
secular information, the reasonable observer can see that the sacred
169 Lynch

v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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text was selected because it is necessary to the secular message, or at
least that it was highly relevant and naturally illustrative or supportive
of the secular message. But when the sacred text is displayed by
itself, the reasonable observer can see only the sacred text and the
state’s desire to promulgate it.
Where the state claims that it is really using the sacred text to
promulgate some secular message, that secular message must be
explicit, it must dominate any religious implications of the display,
and the sacred text must be an integral component, clearly necessary
or at least highly relevant, to the explicit secular message of the
display. The government must carry the burden of rebutting the
presumption that it endorses what it displays. It should be obvious
that not every display that combines religious and secular elements
will meet this standard. Such a display might simply endorse all its
disparate elements, or it might be gerrymandered to include a
marginally relevant sacred text, or its message might depend upon a
claim about the truth of the sacred text. The proposed presumption
would not make every case easy. But it would make many cases easy,
on both sides of the line. By holding governmental units to an
objective standard, much sham litigation would be avoided. Litigation
of these cases would no longer be a wholly unstructured inquiry into
the government’s ad hoc rationalizations, and the courts would no
longer invite governmental units to desacralize sacred texts or
symbols.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even a Court composed of nine aggressive secular liberals
would not order the demolition or sandblasting of every religious
symbol on any government property in America. Some of these
displays, such as “In God We Trust” carved across a building, may
be de minimis to any foreseeable group of Justices.170 Some, such
as the frieze of lawgivers in the Supreme Court’s chamber, are part
of larger display with a clear secular theme. Some, such as the
crosses and other religious symbols on gravestones in government
cemeteries, are private speech. In some cases, such as a
freestanding cross alleged to be a memorial to veterans, a more
politically acceptable remedy might be to add additional symbols
to make the memorial honor all veterans instead of only Christian
veterans. If the Court is determined to permit some longstanding
religious displays to remain just because they have been there a
170 See Laycock, supra note 12, at 223–24, 231–38 (discussing efforts to define a de
minimis exception).
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long time, it would do better to announce a rule explicitly about
time—a grandfather clause, a statute of limitations, or a laches
bar—rather than absurdly trying to secularize symbols that are
plainly religious.
The Court’s new majority may be edging towards a holding
that government is free to promote Christianity as long as it does
so noncoercively. Such a holding would be a tragic mistake in my
view,171 but that’s a different paper. If the Court wants to let
government promote a single faith, it should take on the burden of
openly defending that position. It should not keep struggling to
desacralize sacred texts and sacred symbols in opinions that
nobody believes.
As the Court said in Summum, “It certainly is not common for
property owners to open up their property for the installation of
permanent monuments that convey a message with which they do
not wish to be associated.”172 Governments endorse and promote
the texts, symbols, and depictions that they display. Sacred texts,
sacred symbols, and depictions of miracles are religious. When
government displays sacred texts, sacred symbols, or depictions of
miracles, it is promoting the religious message inherent in the text,
the symbol, or the alleged miracle. And nothing the Court says can
change those facts.

171 See Douglas Laycock, Reviews of a Lifetime, 89 TEX. L. REV. 949, 955–64 (2011)
(reviewing the arguments against allowing government to endorse religion).
172 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1133 (2009).

